Saturday, June 13, 2020

Kawayan Hills Corporation vs. CA

Kawayan Hills Corporation vs. CA

G.R. No. 203090, September 05, 2018
Leonen, J

Kawayan Hills is a domestic corporation dealing with real estate. It is in possession of a 1,461-square-meter parcel of land located in Paoay, Ilocos Norte. All other lots surrounding Lot No. 2512 have been titled in Kawayan Hills' name. Kawayan Hills, filed an application for confirmation and registration of Lot No. 2512's title in its name before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Paoay-Currimao.

The Republic of the Philippines, filed its Opposition to the application. It asserted that Kawayan Hills failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14(1)[16] of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court ruled in favor of Kawayan Hills, confirmed its title over Lot No. 2512, and ordered Lot No. 2512's registration in Kawayan Hills' name.

The CA reversed, on the grounds that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership. The Supreme Court reversed.

Question: Who may apply for land registration of title to land under Presidential Decree No. 1529?

“Section 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.”

Question: Distinguish Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

In Republic v. Gielczyk, the Court summarized and affirmed the differences between Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 as discussed in Heirs of Malabanan:

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further clarified the difference between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the basis of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his property on the basis of prescription. Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of the P.O. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529 and the Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year period is in relation to possession without regard to the Civil Code, while under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.

Question: What are the requisites for registration or judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529?

object of the application;
possession. This possession must be (i) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious; (ii) under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership; and (iii) has taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In jurisprudence, there is also a more nuanced reckoning of requisites for registration under Section 14(1). The applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.”

Question: Are tax declarations or realty tax payments of property conclusive evidence of ownership?

Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Republic v. Spouses Noval went a step further. It did not only favorably consider tax declarations as "good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, and as constituting strong evidence of title." It also considered the applicants' and their predecessors-in-interest consistent payment of real property taxes as militating against the Republic's claim that the land subject of the application was not alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.

Question: Was the CA correct in concluding that title over Lot No. 2512 cannot be confirmed and registered in petitioner’s favor?

No.

CA was in serious error in granting the Republic's appeal and in concluding that title over Lot No. 2512 cannot be confirmed and registered in petitioner's favor. It failed to acknowledge the prolonged duration of consistent and uninterrupted payment of real property taxes; the absence of any adverse claim, save the Republic's opposition; and the confirmation and tillage since 1942. Its haphazard reliance on the notion that real property tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership demonstrates its failure to go about its duty of resolving the case with care and precision. It indicates grave abuse of discretion.

The payment of real property taxes since as far back as 1931 by Kawayan Hills' predecessor-in interest, Andres, should not be dismissed so easily. To the contrary, coupled with evidence of continuous possession, it is a strong indicator of possession in the concept of owner.

Ornales vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman of Luzon

G.R. No. 214312, September 05, 2018

Leonen, J

Chief Executive Officer of Amellar Solutions, wrote to then Mayor Raul Bendaña of Lemery, Batangas with an offer to automate various municipal operations. The Sangguniang Bayan issued a Resolution authorizing Bendaña to enter into an P8,250,000.00 loan agreement with Land Bank of the Philippines for the computerization of the municipality's revenue collection system.

Respondents filed a complaint affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman. They accused members of the Sangguniang Bayan of violating Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 9184, or the Government Procurement Reform Act, when they authorized Bendaña to enter into a direct contract with Amellar Solutions.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution, indicting the Sangguniang Bayan members for violating Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. It also recommended that they be found guilty of grave misconduct. Ornales, Eguia, Vergara, De Castro, and Magnaye assailed the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman’s Resolution with a Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals averred that it only had jurisdiction over issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases and that jurisdiction over the Office of the Ombudsman's issuances in criminal cases lay with the Supreme Court.

Question: Did the CA have jurisdiction over issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases and criminal cases?

No.

As a quasi-judicial agency, decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may only be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a Rule 43 petition.

This Court has repeatedly pronounced that the Office of the Ombudsman's orders and decisions in criminal cases may be elevated to this Court in a Rule 65 petition, while its orders and decisions in administrative disciplinary cases may be raised on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition questioning public respondent's finding of probable cause for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, petitioners' failure to avail of the correct procedure with respect to the criminal case renders public respondent's decision final.

Pagdanganan vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 202678, September 05, 2018

Third Division

Leonen, J

Solid Guaranty is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance business. Solid Guaranty, through Pagdanganan, a minority stockholder, filed a complaint for interpleader before the RTC-Manila. The complaint was filed because of the alleged conflicting claims between Ma. Susana A.S. Madrigal, Ma. Ana A.S. Madrigal, and Ma. Rosa A.S. Madrigal (collectively, the Madrigals), and Citibank over the shares of stock previously held by the late Antonio P. Madrigal.

The petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus seeking to compel the CA to resolve the Petition in CAG.R. SP No. 104291, alleging that the CA committed inordinate delay in violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases.

Question: When does a case become petition moot and academic?

In Baldo v. Commission on Elections stated:

A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. Xxx

In this Petition, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the Court of Appeals to resolve CA-G.R. SP No. 104291. However, the Court of Appeals already rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 104291 on February 8, 2013. It also resolved petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration on March 10, 2014. Despite the occurrence of these subsequent events, petitioners, in their Memorandum, reiterated their prayer for this Court to compel the Court of Appeals to resolve CA-G.R. SP No. 104291.

Any issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case, however, becomes an exercise in futility. The Court of Appeals cannot be compelled to resolve a case it has already fully resolved. This Petition must be dismissed for being moot.

Question: Did the CA commit an inordinate delay in resolving the petition in CAG.R. SP No. 104291?

No.

Even assuming that this Court could still pass upon the substantive issue in this case, the Petition would still be denied for lack of merit. It was only on December 14, 2012 that the Court of Appeals declared with finality that CA-G.R. SP No. 104291 was deemed submitted for decision.

Under Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitutionthis provision, the Court of Appeals is given a 12-month period to resolve any case that has already been submitted for decision. Any case still pending 12 months after submission for decision may be considered as delay. The parties may file the necessary action, such as a petition for mandamus, to protect their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.

In this case, however, petitioners' invocation of the right to speedy disposition of cases is misplaced since the Court of Appeals has resolved the petition in a timely manner within the period provided by law.

Saturday, June 6, 2020

Amoguis vs. Ballado and Ledesma (Civil Law)

Amoguis vs. Ballado and Ledesma

G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018

Third Division

Leonen, J

In 1969, Francisco Ballado (Francisco) and Concepcion Ballado (Concepcion) (collectively, the Ballado Spouses) entered into two contracts with owner and developer St. Joseph Realty, Ltd. (St. Joseph Realty) to buy on installment parcels of land, which were designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2, and were located in Block No. 1, Dadiangas Heights Subdivision, General Santos City.

The Ballado Spouses initially paid a total of P500.00 for the lots, and had to pay monthly for 180 months starting on December 30, 1969. St. Joseph Realty characterized the contracts as contracts to sell and provided for automatic rescission and cancellation.

The Ballado Spouses amortized until 1979 when Crisanto Pinili (Pinili), St. Joseph Realty's collector, refused to receive their payments. They erected a small house made of light materials for their caretaker. Pinili informed them that it was an eyesore and was against the rules of the subdivision. He advised to suspend the payment for the lots, and directed the Ballado Spouses to remove the small house before payments could continue. Francisco informed St. Joseph Realty that the small house had already been taken down, but Pinili still did not come to collect.

By February 1987, the Ballado Spouses discovered that St. Joseph Realty rescinded their contracts. They found out that St. Joseph Realty had sent written demands to pay to the address of Lot Nos. 1 and 2, and not to their residence as declared in the contracts.

Meanwhile, on February 9, 1987, St. Joseph Realty sold Lot Nos. 1 and 2 to the Amoguis Brothers. The Amoguis Brothers then occupied the lots. On August 18, 1987, titles were issued in the Amoguis Brothers' names.

Francisco confronted the Amoguis Brothers when he saw that the barbed fences, which he had installed around the lots, were taken down. Epifanio told him that he bought the lots from St. Joseph Realty. Thereafter, the Amoguis Brothers took down Francisco's mango and chico trees.

Petitioners argue that they are buyers in good faith, as determined by the Court of Appeals. As innocent purchasers, reconveyance is no longer a feasible option against them especially since they have introduced a multitude of improvements on the properties. They have occupied the land since 1987.

Respondents argue that the Amoguis Brothers never denied that they were buyers in bad faith. Despite protests from the Ballado Spouses, petitioners continued introducing improvements over the properties.

Question: Are the petitioners buyers in good faith?

No.

A buyer in good faith is one who purchases and pays fair price for a property without notice that another has an interest over or right to it. If a land is registered and is covered by a certificate of title, any person may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title, and he or she is not obliged to go beyond the four (4) corners of the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

This rule does not apply, however, when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.

It is incumbent upon a buyer to prove good faith should he or she assert this status. This burden cannot be discharged by merely invoking the legal presumption of good faith. This Court rules that based on the evidence on record, petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Though they were informed by Francisco on his claim to the properties only after their purchase, it is undisputed from the records that mango and chico trees were planted on the properties, and that they were cordoned off by barbed wires. St. Joseph Realty also informed them that there were previous buyers, who allegedly abandoned their purchase. To merely claim that they were buyers in good faith, absent any proof, does not make the case for them.

Amogius vs. Ballado and Ledesma (Remedial Law)

Amogius vs. Ballado and Ledesma

G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018

Third Division

Leonen, J

NHA jurisdiction; estoppel; Tijam

The Ballado Spouses filed a Complaint for damages, injunction with writ of preliminary injunction, mandatory injunction, cancellation and annulment of titles, and attorney's fees. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Ballado Spouses, and against St. Joseph Realty and the Amoguis Brothers.

Though not raised, the Court of Appeals discussed at the outset the issue of jurisdiction. Since the Ballado Spouses wanted St. Joseph Realty to comply with the provisions of the contracts to sell, the Complaint was for specific performance. The subject matter of the case involved subdivision lots. Therefore, jurisdiction was lodged with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that since neither St. Joseph Realty nor the Amoguis Brothers raised the issue of jurisdiction before the Regional Trial Court, they must be considered estopped from raising it on appeal.

Question: Did the RTC have subject matter jurisdiction in this case?

No.

Solid Homes cemented the National Housing Authority's jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for damages and attorney's fees incidental to unsound business practices, claims for refund, and for specific performance against subdivision lot or condominium unit owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen. This Court ruled that the qualifier "and any other claims" in Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1344 meant so. In Solid Homes, this Court also ruled that as an administrative body, the National Housing Authority possessed specialized competence and experience to determine these allied matters.

According to Presidential Decree No. 1344, exclusive original jurisdiction for specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman is lodged with the National Housing Authority.

Question: Are the parties in this case estopped from raising subject matter jurisdiction before the Supreme Court?

Yes.

Estoppel by laches bars a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction in an unjustly belated manner especially when it actively participated during trial.

xxx

Tijam set a precedent to stop legal machinations where jurisdiction was raised at the very last minute when the parties have already gone through long years of litigation. It was not so much an issue of time than it was an issue of fairness. Though conferred by law, fairness and equity must temper the parties' bravado to raise jurisdiction when they have participated in proceedings in the lower courts or when an unfavorable judgment against them has been rendered.

xxx

In summary, Tijam applies to a party claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction when:

there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;
the statutory right was not invoked;
an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction;
the claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court without jurisdiction;
the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which forum possesses subject matter jurisdiction;
irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who relied on the forum and the claimant's implicit waiver.

Tijam applies in this case. The allegations, determinative of subject matter jurisdiction, were apparent on the face of the Complaint. The law that determines jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority had been in place for more than a decade when the Complaint was filed. St. Joseph Realty raised lack of jurisdiction in its Answer. Petitioners sought affirmative relief from the Regional Trial Court and actively participated in all stages of the proceedings. Therefore, there was no valid reason for petitioners to raise the issue of jurisdiction only now before this Court.

Osorio vs. People

G.R. No. 20711, July 2, 2018

Third Division

Leonen, J

estafa; other deceits; variance

Gabriel was a proprietor of a stall in Paco Market, Manila. Osorio visited Gabriel's store and introduced herself as an agent of PhilAm Life. As proof, Osorio presented her company ID and calling card. During their meeting, Osorio offered insurance coverage to Gabriel.

Gabriel availed Philam Life's Tri-Life Plan and Excelife Gold Package. Gabriel consistently paid the quarterly premiums from February 2001 to November 2001.

On November 19, 2001, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment opportunity with Philam Life Fund Management. The proposed investment would be placed under a time deposit scheme and would earn 20% annually. Osorio informed Gabriel that the proceeds of her investment may be channeled to pay for her insurance premiums. Enticed by the offer, Gabriel tendered ₱200,000.00 to Osorio, who in turn issued Philam Life receipts.

A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance policies had lapsed due to non-payment of premiums. When Gabriel confronted Osorio about the matter, Osorio assured Gabriel that she would take responsibility.

Meanwhile, in May 2002, Gabriel received a letter from Philippine Money Investment Asset Management (PMIAM), thanking her for investing in the company. Osorio explained that PMIAM investments would yield a higher rate of return. Displeased with what had happened, Gabriel asked for a refund of her initial investment.

Gabriel received ₱13,000.00 from PMIAM as evidenced. In spite of this, Gabriel insisted on the refund. Later, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her initial investment and unpaid interest income would be released to her on May 14, 2004. Unfortunately, she was unable to recover it.

The RTC rendered judgment finding Osorio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. It ruled that Gabriel was induced to part with her money through Osorio's misrepresentation that it would be invested in Philam Life, a company with an established reputation. It rejected Osorio's defense that Gabriel later on consented to the placement. When she was informed of the placement with PMIAM, Gabriel had no other choice but to agree.

In praying for her acquittal, petitioner asserts that not all the elements of estafa under Article 3 15(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code were established by the prosecution. Only damage on the part of the private complainant was proven. Petitioner argues that she did not employ any deceit in soliciting private complainant's investment as nothing in the records shows that she used a fictitious name or that she pretended to possess power, agency, or certain qualifications. Fernandez, one of the prosecution's witnesses, even admitted that she was a Philam Life agent.

Furthermore, petitioner claims that she acted in good faith when she decided to place private complainant's investment in PMIAM. She adds that she did not conceal this from private complainant, who later on agreed to the placement.

Question: Do the petitioner’s acts constitute estafa as defined and punished under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code?

No.

Petitioner was charged with estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code:

“Article 315. Swindling (Estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
. . . .

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

In sustaining a conviction under this provision, the following elements must concur:

(a) [T]hat there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.”

There are different modalities of committing the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a). The false pretense or fraudulent representation referred to under the first element exists when the accused uses a fictitious name, pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or when the accused commits other similar deceits.

There is no evidence to prove that petitioner committed any of these acts when she obtained private complainant's money.

Petitioner neither used a fictitious name nor misrepresented herself as an agent of Philam Life. During her first meeting with private complainant, petitioner presented her company ID and calling card as proof of her identity and employment. Fernandez, head of Philam Life's Business Values and Compliance Department, even admitted during trial that petitioner had been a Philam Life agent.

There is also no proof that petitioner pretended to possess the authority to solicit investments for Philam Life Fund Management. All that F emandez stated was that the issuance of Philam Life receipts to private complainant was improper because the receipts only cover insurance premium payments. 56 Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, it is presumed that petitioner was authorized to solicit money for investment purposes.

In estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the element of deceit consisting of the false pretense or representation must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, criminal liability will not attach.

In this case, although there is no proof that petitioner used a fictitious name or pretended to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business in soliciting private complainant's money, petitioner should nevertheless be held criminally liable for misrepresenting to private complainant that the latter's money would be invested in Philam Life Fund Management and that its proceeds may be utilized to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums.

Private complainant accepted the investment opportunity offered by petitioner due to the promise that her money would be invested in Philam Life, a company with which she had existing insurance policies. She parted with her funds because of the representation that her investment's earnings would be conveniently channeled to the payment of her insurance premiums. As a result of petitioner's representations, private complainant no longer saw the need to pay for the succeeding insurance premiums as they fell due. Moreover, petitioner's issuance of Philam Life receipts led private complainant to believe that her money was already as good as invested in the company.

The false representations committed by petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of "other similar deceits" under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "other similar deceits" in Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code has been interpreted in Guinhawa v. People as limited to acts of the same nature as those specifically enumerated. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "other similar deceits" cannot be construed in the broadest sense to include all kinds of deceit.

Question: Is the petitioner liable under any provision of the RPC?

Yes.

Petitioner may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all provision to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code.

For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must exist:

(a) [The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [Articles 315, 316, and 317]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.

All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.

Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant's money, falsely represented that it would be invested in Philam Life and that its proceeds would be used to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums. This false representation is what induced private complainant to part with her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance premiums. Since petitioner deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the investment in another company, private complainant's insurance policies lapsed.

Question: Is the present case the same as money market transactions where dealers are usually given full discretion on where to place their client's investments?

No. In money market transactions, the dealer is given discretion on where investments are to be placed, absent any agreement with or instruction from the investor to place the investments in specific securities.

Question: Petitioner was charged of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. Can she be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code?

As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or she is charged. This rule proceeds from the Constitutional guarantee that an accused shall always be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her. An exception to this is the rule on variance under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states:

“RULE 120 - Judgment
Section 4. Judgment in Case of Variance Between Allegation and Proof - When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure simply means that if there is a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved, an accused may be convicted of the offense proved if it is included in the offense charged. An accused may also be convicted of the offense charged if it is necessarily included in the offense proved.”

In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is necessarily included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, petitioner may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

Sunday, May 31, 2020

Abuda vs. L. Natividad Poultry Farms

G.R. No. 200712, July 4, 2018

Third Division

Leonen, J

The workers of L. Natividad Poultry Farms (L. Natividad) filed complaints for "illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, thirteenth month pay, and moral and exemplary damages" against it and its owner, Juliana Natividad (Juliana), and manager, Merlinda Natividad (Merlinda).

The workers claimed that L. Natividad employed and terminated their employment after several years of employment.

The NLRC found that the workers were hired as maintenance personnel by San Mateo General Services (“San Mateo”) and Rodolfo Del Remedios on pakyaw basis to perform specific services for L. Natividad. NLRC concluded that San Mateo and Del Remedios were the workers’ real employers, not L. Natividad.

Petitioners claim that as maintenance personnel assigned to respondent L. Natividad's farms and sales outlets, they performed functions that were necessary and desirable to L. Natividad's usual business. They assert that they have been continuously employed by L. Natividad for a period ranging from more than one (1) year to 17 years.

Petitioners point out that respondents used the supposed contracting arrangement with petitioner Del Remedios to prevent them from becoming L. Natividad's regular employees.

Respondents deny that the petitioners, who claim to be maintenance personnel are their employees and declare that they were hired by independent contractors, who exercised control over them and paid their wages.

Question: When is there “labor-only” contracting and what is its effect?

There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. [Art. 106 of the Labor Code]

Question: The CA found that the maintenance personnel were hired on a piece rate or pakyaw basis about once or thrice a year, to perform repair or maintenance works; thus, they could not be considered as regular employees. Is the fact that an employee is hired on a piece-rate or pakyaw basis indicative that he is not a regular employee?

No.

A pakyaw or task basis arrangement defines the manner of payment of wages and not the relationship between the parties.

Payment through pakyaw or task basis is provided for in Articles 97(f) and 101 of the Labor Code:

Article 97. Definitions. — As used in this Title:
(f) "Wage" paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the employee. "Fair and reasonable value" shall not include any profit to the employer, or to any person affiliated with the employer.
xxx
Article 101. Payment by results. — (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall regulate the payment of wages by results, including pakyao, piecework, and other non-time work, in order to ensure the payment of fair and reasonable wage rates, preferably through time and motion studies or in consultation with representatives of workers' and employers' organizations.Gapayao v. Fulo62 likewise categorically stated that pakyaw workers may be considered as regular employees provided that their employers exercised control over them. Thus, while petitioners may have been paid on pakyaw or task basis, their mode of compensation did not preclude them from being regular employees.

Both the NLRC and the CA found respondent L. Natividad to be petitioners' real employer, in light of the labor-only contracting arrangement between respondents, San Mateo, and petitioner Del Remedios. This Court sees no reason to disturb their findings since their findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Furthermore, a resort to the four (4)-fold test of "(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct" also strengthens the finding that respondent L. Natividad is petitioners' employer.

Respondents hired petitioners directly or through petitioner Del Remedios, a supervisor at respondents' farm. They likewise paid petitioners' wages, as seen by the vouchers issued to Del Remedios and San Mateo. They also had the power of dismissal inherent in their power to select and engage their employees. Most importantly though, they controlled petitioners and their work output by maintaining an attendance sheet and by giving them specific tasks and assignments.

Gapayao v. Fulo likewise categorically stated that pakyaw workers may be considered as regular employees provided that their employers exercised control over them. Thus, while petitioners may have been paid on pakyaw or task basis, their mode of compensation did not preclude them from being regular employees.

Question: Are petitioners, being workers doing carpentry and masonry, ‘regular employees’ of L. Natividad, a company engaged in livestock and poultry production?

Yes.

De Leon v. NLRC "[t]he primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer." The connection is determined by considering the nature of the work performed vis-a-vis the entirety of the business or trade. Likewise, if an employee has been on the job for at least one (1) year, even if the performance of the job is intermittent, the repeated and continuous need for the employee's services is sufficient evidence of the indispensability of his or her services to the employer's business.

Respondents did not refute petitioners' claims that they continuously worked for respondents for a period ranging from three (3) years to 17 years. Thus, even if the CA is of the opinion that carpentry and masonry are not necessary or desirable to the business of livestock and poultry production, the nature of their employment could have been characterized as being under the second paragraph of Article 280. Thus, petitioners' service of more than one (1) year to respondents has made them regular employees for so long as the activities they were required to do subsist.

Nonetheless, a careful review of petitioners' activity as maintenance personnel and of the entirety of respondents' business convinces this Court that they performed activities which were necessary and desirable to respondents' business of poultry and livestock production.

As maintenance personnel, petitioners performed "repair works and maintenance services such as fixing livestock and poultry houses and facilities as well as doing construction activities within the premises of [L. Natividad's] farms and other sales outlets for an uninterrupted period of three (3) to seventeen (17) years." Respondents had several farms and offices in Quezon City and Montalban, including Patiis Farm, where petitioners were regularly deployed to perform repair and maintenance work.

At first glance it may appear that maintenance personnel are not necessary to a poultry and livestock business. However, in this case, respondents kept several farms, offices, and sales outlets, meaning that they had animal houses and other related structures necessary to their business that needed constant repair and maintenance.

Question: Being regular employees, petitioners, who were maintenance personnel, enjoyed security of tenure and the termination of their services without just cause entitles them to reinstatement and full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits. Petitioners maintain that their employments were terminated by respondents in an "oppressive, malicious and unjustified manner." Are the petitioners also entitled to moral and exemplary damages?

No.

The prayer for moral and exemplary damages must be denied. The termination of employment without just cause or due process does not immediately justify the award of moral and exemplary damages. Philippine School of Business Administration v. National Labor Relations Commission stated:

“This Court however cannot sustain the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of private respondents. Such an award cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proved to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code. The act of dismissal must be attended with bad faith, or fraud or was oppressive to labor or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted therefrom. Similarly, exemplary damages are recoverable only when the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.”

Petitioners maintain that their employments were terminated by respondents in an "oppressive, malicious and unjustified manner," yet they failed to explain or illustrate how their dismissal was oppressive, malicious, or unjustified. It is not enough that they were dismissed without due process. Additional acts of the employers must also be pleaded and proved to show that their dismissal was tainted with bad faith or fraud, was oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Petitioners failed to allege any acts by respondents which would justify the award of moral or exemplary damages.

Lee vs. Sales

G.R. No. 205294, July 4, 2018

Third Division

Leonen J

execution of a decision dismissing a public officer from service

In its July 16, 2012 Decision, the Ombudsman found the Spouses Lee guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. It found that they separately filed their SALNs from 2001 to 2006, apart from 2003 for which they filed a joint SALN. However, even though they filed separate SALNs in 2001 and 2002, the entries on the assets, real and personal liabilities, and business interests and financial connections were the same. This proved that they commonly owned the assets in the SALNs, and confirmed the regime of absolute community of property controlling their property relations.

On September 11, 2012, Elmer filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision. The Chief of the Personnel Inquiry Division directed Elmer, among others, to turn over all government assets and documents to the head office, transfer his accountabilities, and surrender his BIR ID. It further prohibited him from reporting to the office, representing the office, instructing staff members on official matters, and signing any documents, among others.

Elmer filed a Petition for Injunction and/or Prohibition and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He prayed for the trial court to enjoin herein respondents from executing his dismissal from service. He claimed that the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision was not yet final and executory due to his pending motion for reconsideration, as the Ombudsman's Administrative Order No. 07 did not categorically state the effects of the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

Question: Does a pending motion for reconsideration stay the execution of a decision of the Ombudsman dismissing a public officer from service?

No.

A pending motion for reconsideration of a decision issued by the Office of the Ombudsman does not stay its immediate execution. This is clear under the rules of the Office of the Ombudsman and our jurisprudence.

xxx

The Ombudsman is the Constitutional body tasked to preserve the integrity of public service, and must be beholden to no one. To uphold its independence, this Court has adopted a general policy of non-interference with the exercise of the Ombudsman of its prosecutorial and investigatory powers. The execution of its decisions is part of the exercise of these powers to which this Court gives deference.

Further, after a ruling supported by evidence has been rendered and during the pendency of any motion for reconsideration or appeal, the civil service must be protected from any acts that may be committed by the disciplined public officer that may affect the outcome of this motion or appeal. The immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman is a protective measure with a purpose similar to that of preventive suspension, which is to prevent public officers from using their powers and prerogatives to influence witnesses or tamper with records.