Abuda vs. L. Natividad Poultry Farms

G.R. No. 200712, July 4, 2018

Third Division

Leonen, J

The workers of L. Natividad Poultry Farms (L. Natividad) filed complaints for "illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, thirteenth month pay, and moral and exemplary damages" against it and its owner, Juliana Natividad (Juliana), and manager, Merlinda Natividad (Merlinda).

The workers claimed that L. Natividad employed and terminated their employment after several years of employment. 

The NLRC found that the workers were hired as maintenance personnel by San Mateo General Services (“San Mateo”) and Rodolfo Del Remedios on pakyaw basis to perform specific services for L. Natividad. NLRC concluded that San Mateo and Del Remedios were the workers’ real employers, not L. Natividad.

Petitioners claim that as maintenance personnel assigned to respondent L. Natividad's farms and sales outlets, they performed functions that were necessary and desirable to L. Natividad's usual business. They assert that they have been continuously employed by L. Natividad for a period ranging from more than one (1) year to 17 years.

Petitioners point out that respondents used the supposed contracting arrangement with petitioner Del Remedios to prevent them from becoming L. Natividad's regular employees.

Respondents deny that the petitioners, who claim to be maintenance personnel are their employees and declare that they were hired by independent contractors, who exercised control over them and paid their wages.

Question: When is there “labor-only” contracting and what is its effect?

There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. [Art. 106 of the Labor Code]

Question: The CA found that the maintenance personnel were hired on a piece rate or pakyaw basis about once or thrice a year, to perform repair or maintenance works; thus, they could not be considered as regular employees. Is  the fact that an employee is hired on a piece-rate or pakyaw basis indicative that he is not a regular employee?

No.

A pakyaw or task basis arrangement defines the manner of payment of wages and not the relationship between the parties.

Payment through pakyaw or task basis is provided for in Articles 97(f) and 101 of the Labor Code:

Article 97. Definitions. — As used in this Title:

(f) "Wage" paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the employee. "Fair and reasonable value" shall not include any profit to the employer, or to any person affiliated with the employer.

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Article 101. Payment by results. — (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall regulate the payment of wages by results, including pakyao, piecework, and other non-time work, in order to ensure the payment of fair and reasonable wage rates, preferably through time and motion studies or in consultation with representatives of workers' and employers' organizations.Gapayao v. Fulo62 likewise categorically stated that pakyaw workers may be considered as regular employees provided that their employers exercised control over them. Thus, while petitioners may have been paid on pakyaw or task basis, their mode of compensation did not preclude them from being regular employees.

Both the NLRC and the CA found respondent L. Natividad to be petitioners' real employer, in light of the labor-only contracting arrangement between respondents, San Mateo, and petitioner Del Remedios. This Court sees no reason to disturb their findings since their findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Furthermore, a resort to the four (4)-fold test of "(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct" also strengthens the finding that respondent L. Natividad is petitioners' employer.

Respondents hired petitioners directly or through petitioner Del Remedios, a supervisor at respondents' farm. They likewise paid petitioners' wages, as seen by the vouchers issued to Del Remedios and San Mateo. They also had the power of dismissal inherent in their power to select and engage their employees. Most importantly though, they controlled petitioners and their work output by maintaining an attendance sheet and by giving them specific tasks and assignments.

Gapayao v. Fulo likewise categorically stated that pakyaw workers may be considered as regular employees provided that their employers exercised control over them. Thus, while petitioners may have been paid on pakyaw or task basis, their mode of compensation did not preclude them from being regular employees.

Question: Are petitioners, being workers doing carpentry and masonry, ‘regular employees’ of L. Natividad, a company engaged in livestock and poultry production?

Yes.

De Leon v. NLRC "[t]he primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer." The connection is determined by considering the nature of the work performed vis-a-vis the entirety of the business or trade. Likewise, if an employee has been on the job for at least one (1) year, even if the performance of the job is intermittent, the repeated and continuous need for the employee's services is sufficient evidence of the indispensability of his or her services to the employer's business.

Respondents did not refute petitioners' claims that they continuously worked for respondents for a period ranging from three (3) years to 17 years.  Thus, even if the CA is of the opinion that carpentry and masonry are not necessary or desirable to the business of livestock and poultry production, the nature of their employment could have been characterized as being under the second paragraph of Article 280. Thus, petitioners' service of more than one (1) year to respondents has made them regular employees for so long as the activities they were required to do subsist.

Nonetheless, a careful review of petitioners' activity as maintenance personnel and of the entirety of respondents' business convinces this Court that they performed activities which were necessary and desirable to respondents' business of poultry and livestock production.

As maintenance personnel, petitioners performed "repair works and maintenance services such as fixing livestock and poultry houses and facilities as well as doing construction activities within the premises of [L. Natividad's] farms and other sales outlets for an uninterrupted period of three (3) to seventeen (17) years." Respondents had several farms and offices in Quezon City and Montalban, including Patiis Farm, where petitioners were regularly deployed to perform repair and maintenance work.

At first glance it may appear that maintenance personnel are not necessary to a poultry and livestock business. However, in this case, respondents kept several farms, offices, and sales outlets, meaning that they had animal houses and other related structures necessary to their business that needed constant repair and maintenance.

Question: Being regular employees, petitioners, who were maintenance personnel, enjoyed security of tenure and the termination of their services without just cause entitles them to reinstatement and full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits. Petitioners maintain that their employments were terminated by respondents in an "oppressive, malicious and unjustified manner." Are the petitioners also entitled to moral and exemplary damages?

No.

The prayer for moral and exemplary damages must be denied. The termination of employment without just cause or due process does not immediately justify the award of moral and exemplary damages. Philippine School of Business Administration v. National Labor Relations Commission stated:

“This Court however cannot sustain the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of private respondents. Such an award cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proved to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code. The act of dismissal must be attended with bad faith, or fraud or was oppressive to labor or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted therefrom. Similarly, exemplary damages are recoverable only when the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.”

Petitioners maintain that their employments were terminated by respondents in an "oppressive, malicious and unjustified manner," yet they failed to explain or illustrate how their dismissal was oppressive, malicious, or unjustified. It is not enough that they were dismissed without due process. Additional acts of the employers must also be pleaded and proved to show that their dismissal was tainted with bad faith or fraud, was oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Petitioners failed to allege any acts by respondents which would justify the award of moral or exemplary damages.

Lee vs. Sales

G.R. No. 205294, July 4, 2018

Third Division

Leonen J

execution of a decision dismissing a public officer from service

In its July 16, 2012 Decision, the Ombudsman found the Spouses Lee guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. It found that they separately filed their SALNs from 2001 to 2006, apart from 2003 for which they filed a joint SALN. However, even though they filed separate SALNs in 2001 and 2002, the entries on the assets, real and personal liabilities, and business interests and financial connections were the same. This proved that they commonly owned the assets in the SALNs, and confirmed the regime of absolute community of property controlling their property relations. 

On September 11, 2012, Elmer filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision. The Chief of the Personnel Inquiry Division directed Elmer, among others, to turn over all government assets and documents to the head office, transfer his accountabilities, and surrender his BIR ID. It further prohibited him from reporting to the office, representing the office, instructing staff members on official matters, and signing any documents, among others.

Elmer filed a Petition for Injunction and/or Prohibition and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He prayed for the trial court to enjoin herein respondents from executing his dismissal from service. He claimed that the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision was not yet final and executory due to his pending motion for reconsideration, as the Ombudsman's Administrative Order No. 07 did not categorically state the effects of the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

Question: Does a pending motion for reconsideration stay the execution of a decision of the Ombudsman dismissing a public officer from service?

No.

A pending motion for reconsideration of a decision issued by the Office of the Ombudsman does not stay its immediate execution. This is clear under the rules of the Office of the Ombudsman and our jurisprudence.

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The Ombudsman is the Constitutional body tasked to preserve the integrity of public service, and must be beholden to no one. To uphold its independence, this Court has adopted a general policy of non-interference with the exercise of the Ombudsman of its prosecutorial and investigatory powers. The execution of its decisions is part of the exercise of these powers to which this Court gives deference.

Further, after a ruling supported by evidence has been rendered and during the pendency of any motion for reconsideration or appeal, the civil service must be protected from any acts that may be committed by the disciplined public officer that may affect the outcome of this motion or appeal. The immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman is a protective measure with a purpose similar to that of preventive suspension, which is to prevent public officers from using their powers and prerogatives to influence witnesses or tamper with records.

TILAR vs. TILAR

TILAR vs. TILAR

G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017

SECOND DIVISION

Peralta, J.

DIRECT RECOURSE from the Decision and the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, (RTC) dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.

Facts:

On November 4, 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of private respondent's (respondent) psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Respondent failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The Public Prosecutor, in his Manifestation and Compliance, as to the absence of collusion between the parties. Trial, thereafter, ensued with petitioner and his witness testifying. 

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.  The RTC applied the doctrine of separation of Church and State:

“...Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an annulment in the Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an ecclesiastical tribunal determining that the sacrament of marriage was invalidly contracted. The procedure is governed by the Church's Canon Law not by the civil law observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil marriages...”

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Ruling:

Yes. GRANTED.

Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the constitutional provision to protect the inviolability of marriage and the family relations. In one of the whereas clauses of the Family Code, it is stated: 

"Whereas, there is a need to implement policies embodied in the New Constitution that strengthen marriage and the family as a basic social institution and ensure equality between men and women. 

 

Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:

 

 

"Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code."

xxx 

Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of petitioner and respondent which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance with the above-quoted provisions. Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of the church and state finds no application in this case. 

As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds for the termination of marriage. These grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides: 

"Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xx xx (15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;"

Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before the RTC of Baybay City, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 

ABELLA vs. CABANERO

ABELLA vs. CABAÑERO

G.R. No. 206647, August 9, 2017

SECOND DIVISION

Leonen, J.

Support

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA). 

Facts:

In a complaint for Support, the petitioner Richelle P. Abella  alleged that while she was still a minor in the years 2000 to 2002, she was repeatedly sexually abused by respondent Cabanero inside his rest house. As a result, she allegedly gave birth to a child on August 21, 2002. Richelle added that she initiated a criminal case for rape and, later, another criminal case under R.A. 7610, but both cases were dismissed. She prayed for a monthly allowance for the child in the amount of P3,000.00.

The respondent Policarpio Cabanero denied the sexual abuse or otherwise having any sexual relations with Richelle.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Richelle’s complaint without prejudice, on the account of her failure to implead her minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff. 

The Court of Appeals (CA) disagreed with the RTC and ordered the amendment of the caption to implead the minor child. However, the CA still ruled that the dismissal of the complaint was proper as the filiation had not been previously established. The child’s birth certificate did not indicate that Cabanero was the father and as Cabanero had not done anything to voluntarily recognize the child as his own, CA asserted that Richelle “should have first instituted filiation proceedings to adjudicate the minor child’s paternity.”

Issue:

Whether or not the filiation proceedings should have first been separately instituted to ascertain the minor child’s paternity and that without these proceedings having first been resolved in favor of the child’s paternity claim, petitioner’s action for support could not prosper.

Ruling:

No. REMANDED.

While it is true that the grant of support was contingent on ascertaining paternal relations between respondent and petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was unnecessary for petitioner's action for support to have been dismissed and terminated by the Court of Appeals in the manner that it did. Instead of dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court. There, petitioner and her daughter should have been enabled to present evidence to establish their cause of action-inclusive of their underlying claim of paternal relations-against respondent.

xx xxx

While ably noting that filiation had yet to be established, the Court of Appeals' discussion and final disposition are not in keeping with jurisprudence. Dolina v. Vallera clarified that since an action for compulsory recognition may be filed ahead of an action for support, the direct filing of an action for support, "where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved," is an equally valid alternative: “xxx xxx Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.”

xxx xxx

Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely appropriate" to the action for support filed by petitioner Richelle for her child. An action for support may very well resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the same parties, is brought before a court with the proper jurisdiction, prays to impel recognition of paternal relations, and invokes judicial intervention to do so, This does not run afoul of any rule. To the contrary, and consistent with Briz v. Briz, this is in keeping with the rules on proper joinder of causes of action. This also serves the interest of judicial economy-avoiding multiplicity of suits and cushioning litigants from the vexation and costs of a protracted pleading of their cause. 

TANI-DE LA FUENTE vs. DE LA FUENTE

TANI-DE LA FUENTE vs. DE LA FUENTE

G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017

SECOND DIVISION

Leonen, J.

Psychological Incapacity

PETITION FOR REVIEW assailing the Decision and Resolution of Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Facts:

Petitioner Maria Teresa Tani-De La Fuente and Rodolfo De La Fuente’s relationship started when they were students in the University of Santo Tomas. They married on June 21, 1984.

Maria Teresa observed that even before marriage Rodolfo was introvert and prone to jealousy. He had no ambitions and was insecure of his siblings who excelled in their studies and careers. Rodolfo’s attitude worsened as they went on their marital life. Rodolfo’s jealousy was so severe that he pointed a gun at a 15 year-old cousin staying at their home whom he suspected to be Maria Teresa’s lover. In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa as a sex slave, having sex 4-5 times a day, even fetching Maria Teresa on lunch breaks just so they could have sex. Rodolfo has even suggested that they even invite a third person into their bed, or another man to have sex with Maria Teresa while Rodolfo watches. 

In 1986, at the heat of a quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa. That prompted Maria Teresa to leave the conjugal dwelling, and from then on never saw Rodolfo again, and she supported the children by herself.

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It was initially archived for Rodolfo’s failure to file a responsive pleading but it was subsequently revived. The Assistant City Prosecutor found no collusion between the parties. Rodolfo failed to attend the pre-trial conference and Maria Teresa was allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was presented as an expert witness. Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather information on her family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of psychological tests. Dr. Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend.

After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez concluded that Maria Teresa was not suffering from any severe mental disorder and had no indication of any organic or functional impairment. Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity." Lopez explained that Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by a pathogenic parental model. Rodolfo's family background showed that his father was a psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic contamination called double insanity, a symptom similar to his father's. Dr. Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable because of his severe paranoia.

The RTC granted the petition but the CA reversed the RTC finding the testimony of Dr. Lopez unreliable for being hearsay. The CA disagreed with Dr. Lopez's finding that Rodolfo's behavior descended from psychological illness contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligation.

Ruling: 

Yes. GRANTED.

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, must give due regard to expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.

The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological disorder probably started during his late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model.

The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before their marriage, and that he would often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him. She believed that he would change after they got married; however, this did not happen. Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

xxx xxx

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.

DOMINGO vs. SINGSON

G.R. No. 203287, April 15, 2017

FIRST DIVISION

Reyes, J

Prejudicial Question

TWO CONSOLIDATED PETITIONS FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI seeking to annul and set aside the Decisions issued by the Court of Appeals (CA).

Facts:

During their lifetime, Spouses Macario and Felicidad Domingo owned a parcel of land situated in F. Sevilla Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. Macario and Felicidad died in 1981 and 1997, respectively. 

In 2006, the daughter, respondent Engracia Singson, filed a Complaint for Ejectment/Unlawful Detainer against the petitioner and co-heirs. She claimed to be the absolute owner of the property having bought the same from their parents as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated June 6, 2006. It was the first time the petitioners learned of the supposed sale when they received the summons and copy of the Complaint. 

As a response, the petitioners filed a civil action and subsequently a criminal complaint against the respondent. First, a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City to seek the nullity of the sale (Civil Case No. 70898), filed on July 31, 2006. They alleged that the Deed of Sale dated June 6, 2006, upon which Engracia bases her ownership of the subject property, was a nullity since the signatures of their parents appearing thereon as the supposed vendors were forged. Second, a Joint Affidavit Complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig City charging Engracia with the crimes of falsification of public document, estafa, and use of falsified documents (Criminal Case No. 137867).

Engracia and her spouse filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to Prejudicial Question pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the validity and genuineness of the Absolute Deed of Sale which is the subject of the civil case still pending with the RTC are determinative of their guilt of the crime charged.

The private prosecutor filed an opposition to the motion, stating that Criminal Case No. 137867 can proceed independently from Civil Case No. 70898 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

The RTC issued an Order which granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which then denied it.

Issue:

Whether or not it was proper to suspend the criminal proceedings based on the ground of prejudicial question.

Discussion:

Yes, it was proper to suspend the criminal proceedings based on the ground of prejudicial question.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflict decisions. 

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must -be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. 

Based on the issues raised in both Civil Case No. 70898 and Criminal Case No. 137867 against the Spouses Singson, and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar. The defense of the Spouses Singson in the civil case for annulment of sale is that Engracia bought the subject property from her parents prior to their demise and that their signatures appearing on the Absolute Deed of Sale are true and genuine. Their allegation in the civil case is based on the very same facts, which would be necessarily determinative of their guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case.

If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of Sale are genuine, then there would be no falsification and the Spouses Singson would be innocent of the offense charged. Otherwise stated, a conviction on Criminal Case No. 137867, should it be allowed to proceed ahead, would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in Civil Case No. 70898 that indeed the signatures of the Spouses Domingo were authentic.

The petitioners' reliance on Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code, is misplaced. Section 3 provides that a civil action for damages in cases provided under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which may also constitute criminal offenses, may proceed independently of the criminal action. In instances where an independent civil action is permitted, the result of the criminal action, whether of acquittal or conviction, is entirely irrelevant to the civil action. 

The concept of independent civil actions finds no application in this case. Clearly, Civil Case No. 70898 is very much relevant to the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867. To stress, the main issue raised in Civil Case No. 70898, i.e., the genuineness of the signature of the Spouses Domingo appearing in the Absolute Deed of Sale, is intimately related to the charge of estafa through falsification of public document in Criminal Case No. 137867; the resolution of the main issue in Civil Case No. 70898 would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the Spouses Singson.

Accordingly, the RTC Branch 264 correctly suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 on the ground of prejudicial question since, at the time the proceedings in the criminal case were suspended, Civil Case No. 70898 was still pending.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BELEN MEJARES

G.R. No. 225735, January 10, 2018

Intent to Gain

Facts: Mejares, being then a domestic servant of complainant Jacqueline Suzanne Gavino y Aquino, was charged with qualified theft of cash and jewelry amounting to P1,556,308.00. The defense presented Mejares as its lone witness. She denied the charge and claimed that she was a victim of the dugo-dugo gang. Accused-appellant was convicted and filed an appeal on the ground that her actions only reflected the will of her employer, emphasizing that there could be no theft on her part because there was no intent to gain.

Issue: Whether actual gain necessary to prove an accused's intent to gain.

Held: No. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. In this case, it is clear from the established facts that it was accused-appellant who opened the drawer in the masters' bedroom and took away the cash and valuables it contained.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BIENVINIDO UDANG

G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018

Single Act Multiple Offenses

Facts: Two Informations for child abuse were filed against Udang for violation of Article 266-A in relation to Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. RTC convicted Udang of rape under Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, instead of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610. It ratiocinated that while the allegations in the first and second Informations satisfied the elements of rape under the first and third paragraphs of Article 266-A, respectively, the charges can only be one (1) for rape under the first paragraph of Article 266-A because "[an] accused cannot be prosecuted twice for a single criminal act."

Issue: Whether Udang's right against double jeopardy be violated if he was charged with both rape, under Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, and sexual abuse, under Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610.

Held: No. For there to be double jeopardy, "a first jeopardy [must] ha[ve] attached prior to the second; the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and a second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first."

Rape and sexual abuse are two (2) separate crimes with distinct elements. The "force, threat, or intimidation" or deprivation of reason or unconsciousness required in Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not the same as the "coercion or influence" required in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. However, consent exonerates an accused from a rape charge.