UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

Mistake of Fact

Facts: The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. 

One night, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?". Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide

Issue: Whether Ah Chong should be acquitted by reason of a mistake as to the facts

Held: Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact  relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. 

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

Change of First Name and Sex

Facts: Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. Petitioner alleged in his petition that his name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his birth certificate and was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated when he underwent sex reassignment surgery. He was thereafter examined by a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

Held: The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right.  Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.  To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

TUNA PROCESSING, INC. vs. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC.

G.R. No. 185582 February 29, 2012

Legal Capacity to Sue

Facts: Kanemitsu Yamaoka ("licensor"), co-patentee of Yamaoka Patent and five (5) Philippine tuna processors and respondent Kingford ("sponsors"/"licensees") entered into a Memorandum of Agreement. The parties agree to the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. ("TPI"), a corporation established in the State of California, in order to implement the objectives of this Agreement.

Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees, including respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United States and won the case against respondent.

To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award. Petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether the court was correct in dismissing the petition on the ground of petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to sue.

Held: On the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004) has certainly erased any conflict of law question. RA No. 9285 is a law especially enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes.".  It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.

Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in the instant petition, we do not see the need to discuss compliance with international obligations under the New York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already form part of the law.

Petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings.

CHARLITO PEÑARANDA vs. BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORPORATION and HUDSON CHUA

G.R. No. 159577 May 3, 2006

Nature of Employment

Facts: Petitioner Charlito Peñaranda was hired as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer of Baganga Plywood Corporation (BPC) to take charge of the operations and maintenance of its steam plant boiler. In May 2001, Peñaranda filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against BPC and its general manager, Hudson Chua, before the NLRC. He alleges that his services were terminated without due process and valid grounds in accordance with law and that he was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay for working during holidays/rest days, night shift differentials.

BPC, on the other hand, allege that complainant’s separation from service was done pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor Code. He opted to severe employment when he insisted payment of his separation benefits. Furthermore, being a managerial employee he is not entitled to overtime pay and if ever he rendered services beyond the normal hours of work, there was no office order/or authorization for him to do so.

The labor arbiter ruled in favor of BPC but found petitioner entitled to overtime pay, premium pay for working on rest days, and attorney’s fees.

NLRC ruled that Penaranda was a managerial employee and deleted the award of overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days.

CA denied Petitioner’s appeal.

Issue: Whether Penaranda is entitled to the payment of OVERTIME PAY and OTHER MONETARY BENEFITS.

Held: No. The Court disagrees with the NLRC’s finding that petitioner was a managerial employee. However, petitioner was a member of the managerial staff, which also takes him out of the coverage of labor standards. Like managerial employees, officers and members of the managerial staff are not entitled to the provisions of law on labor standards. The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code define members of a managerial staff as those with the following duties and responsibilities:

"(1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of the employer;

"(2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;

"(3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute under general supervision special assignments and tasks; and

"(4) who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above."

Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. His work involved overseeing the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering section. This work necessarily required the use of discretion and independent judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler. As supervisor, petitioner is deemed a member of the managerial staff.

Noteworthy, even petitioner admitted that he was a supervisor. In his Position Paper, he stated that he was the foreman responsible for the operation of the boiler. The term foreman implies that he was the representative of management over the workers and the operation of the department. Petitioner’s evidence also showed that he was the supervisor of the steam plant. His classification as supervisor is further evident from the manner his salary was paid. He belonged to the 10% of respondent’s 354 employees who were paid on a monthly basis; the others were paid only on a daily basis.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

UNIVERSAL MILLS CORPORATION vs. UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC.

G.R. No. L-28351, July 28, 1977

Corporate Name

Facts: The Universal Textile Mills, Inc. was organized on December 29, 1953, as a textile manufacturing firm for which it was issued a certificate of registration on January 8, 1954. The Universal Mills Corporation, on the other hand, was registered on October 27, 1954, under its original name, Universal Hosiery Mills Corporation, having as its primary purpose the manufacture and production of hosieries and wearing apparel of all kinds. On May 24, 1963, it filed an amendment to its articles of incorporation changing its name to Universal Mills Corporation, which was approved on June 10, 1963.

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner to change its name. Petitioner presented documentary and testimonial evidence in support of this allegation.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s trade name is confusingly similar with that of respondent’s?

Held: Yes. The corporate names in question are not identical, but they are indisputably so similar that even under the test of reasonable care and observation as the public generally are capable of using and may be expected to exercise” invoked by appellant. We are apprehensive confusion will usually arise, considering that x xx appellant included among its primary purposes the manufacturing, dyeing, finishing and selling of fabrics of all kinds” which respondent had been engaged for more than a decade ahead of petitioner.

Since respondent is not claiming damages in this proceeding, it is, of course, immaterial whether or not appellant has acted in good faith, but We cannot perceive why of all names, it had to choose a name already being used by another firm engaged in practically the same business for more than a decade enjoying well earned patronage and goodwill, when there are so many other appropriate names it could possibly adopt without arousing any suspicion as to its motive and, more importantly, any degree of confusion in the mind of the public which could mislead even its own customers, existing or prospective.

ANTHONY S. YU, ROSITA G. YU and JASON G. YU, vs. JOSEPH S. YUKAYGUAN, NANCY L. YUKAYGUAN, JERALD NERWIN L. YUKAYGUAN, and JILL NESLIE L. YUKAYGUAN, [on their own behalf and on behalf of] WINCHESTER INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC.

G.R. No. 177549 June 18, 2009

Derivative Suit

Facts: The families of Yu and Yukayguan were all stockholders of Winchester Industrial Supply Inc. The Yukayguans accused the Yu’s of misappropriating the funds and properties of Winchester by understating the sales, charging their personal and family expenses to the corporation and withdrawing stocks for their personal use and without paying the same. For this reason, the Yukayguans filed a complaint for accounting, inspection of corporate books and damages through embezzlement and falsification of corporate records and accounts against the Yu’s. The said complaint was filed in their own behalf and as derivative suit on behalf of Winchester. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that they did not comply with the essential requisites for filing a derivative suit. On appeal the CA upheld the decision but was later reversed and converted into a liquidation proceeding.

Issue: Whether the derivative suit is meritorious.

Held: No. Glaringly, a derivative suit is fundamentally distinct and independent from liquidation proceedings. They are neither part of each other nor the necessary consequence of the other. There is totally no justification for the Court of Appeals to convert what was supposedly a derivative suit instituted by respondents, on their own behalf and on behalf of Winchester, Inc. against petitioners, to a proceeding for the liquidation of Winchester, Inc.

Even assuming arguendo that the parties did submit a petition for the dissolution of Winchester, Inc. and the same was approved by the SEC, the Court of Appeals was still without jurisdiction to order the final settlement by the RTC of the remaining corporate concerns. It must be remembered that the Complaint filed by respondents before the RTC essentially prayed for the accounting and reimbursement by petitioners of the corporate funds and assets which they purportedly misappropriated for their personal use; surrender by the petitioners of the corporate books for the inspection of respondents; and payment by petitioners to respondents of damages. There was nothing in respondents Complaint which sought the dissolution and liquidation of Winchester, Inc. Hence, the supposed dissolution of Winchester, Inc. could not have resulted in the conversion of respondents derivative suit to a proceeding for the liquidation of said corporation, but only in the dismissal of the derivative suit based on either compromise agreement or mootness of the issues.

VIVIAN T. RAMIREZ et al vs. MAR FISHING CO., INC., MIRAMAR FISHING CO., INC., ROBERT BUEHS AND JEROME SPIT

G.R. No. 168208, June 13, 2012

Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil

Facts: On 28 June 2001, Mar Fishing Co., Inc. sold its principal assets to co-respondent Miramar Fishing Co., Inc. Mar Fishing informed its employees that it will cease its operation by the end of the month. Thereafter, Mar Fishing’s labor union entered into a MOA. The agreement provided that Miramar shall absorb Mar Fishing’s regular rank and file employees whose performance was satisfactory. Unfortunately petitioners were not among those absorbed nor paid separation pay by Miramar.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims before the Labor Arbiter. LA found that petitioners were legally dismissed and that Miramar is not liable for the separation pay. NLRC modified the decision that Mar Fishing and Miramar were one and the same entity, it applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.

Issue: Whether NLRC was correct in applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.

Held: NO. The doctrine was inapplicable in the present case. The SC ruled that those who seek to pierce the veil must clearly establish that the separate and distinct personalities of the corporations are set up to justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or perpetrate a deception. The allegation of take-over by Miramar of Mar Fishing operations and the evident of similarity of their businesses fails to meet the rigid standard that merits the application of the doctrine.

VIOLETA TUDTUD BANATE, MARY MELGRID M. CORTEL, BONIFACIO CORTEL, ROSENDO MAGLASANG, and PATROCINIA MONILAR, vs PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK (LILOAN, CEBU), INC. and TEOFILO SOON, JR.

G.R. 163825 July 12, 2010

Corporate Officers 

Facts: On July 22, 1997, petitioner spouses Rosendo Maglasang and Patrocinia Monilar obtained a loan from PCRB for P1,070,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage.

Sometime in November 1997, the spouses Maglasang and the spouses Cortel asked PCRBs permission to sell the subject properties and be released from the mortgage since their two other loans were adequately secured by the other mortgages. The spouses Maglasang and the spouses Cortel claimed that the PCRB, acting through its Branch Manager, Pancrasio Mondigo, verbally agreed to their request but required first the full payment of the subject loan. 

After settling the subject loan, PCRB gave the owners duplicate certificate of title to the buyer, Banate, who was able to secure a new title in her name. However, the title still carried the mortgage lien in favor of PCRB, prompting the petitioners to request from PCRB a Deed of Release of Mortgage. PCRB refused to comply with the petitioners request so the petitioners instituted an action for specific performance before the RTC to compel PCRB to execute the release deed. PCRB considered Banate as a buyer in bad faith as she was fully aware of the existing mortgage in its favor when she purchased the subject properties from the spouses Maglasang and the spouses Cortel. 

The RTC ruled that the petitioners are rightfully entitled to a deed of release of mortgage, pursuant to the verbal agreement that the petitioners made with PCRBs branch manager, Mondigo. 

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs decision. The CA did not consider as valid the petitioners new agreement with Mondigo, which would novate the original mortgage contract containing the cross-collateral stipulation. It ruled that Mondigo cannot orally amend the mortgage contract between PCRB, and the spouses Maglasang and the spouses Cortel; therefore, the claimed commitment allowing the release of the mortgage on the subject properties cannot bind PCRB. 

Issue: Whether the purported agreement between the petitioners and PCRB’s branch manager novated the mortgage contract over the subject properties and is thus binding upon PCRB. 

Held: No. Novation presupposes not only the extinguishment or modification of an existing obligation but, more importantly, the creation of a valid new obligation. For the consequent creation of a new contractual obligation, consent of both parties is, thus, required. As a general rule, no form of words or writing is necessary to give effect to a novation. Nevertheless, where either or both parties involved are juridical entities, proof that the second contract was executed by persons with the proper authority to bind their respective principals is necessary. 

Section 23 of the Corporation Code expressly provides that the corporate powers of all corporations shall be exercised by the board of directors. The power and the responsibility to decide whether the corporation should enter into a contract that will bind the corporation are lodged in the board, subject to the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or relevant provisions of law. In the absence of authority from the board of directors, no person, not even its officers, can validly bind a corporation. 

However, just as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts for and on his behalf, the board of directors may validly delegate some of its functions and powers to its officers, committees or agents. The authority of these individuals to bind the corporation is generally derived from law, corporate bylaws or authorization from the board, either expressly or impliedly by habit, custom or acquiescence in the general course of business. 

In the present case, the decision of the trial court was utterly silent on the manner by which PCRB, as supposed principal, has clothed or held out its branch manager as having the power to enter into an agreement, as claimed by petitioners. No proof of the course of business, usages and practices of the bank about, or knowledge that the board had or is presumed to have of, its responsible officers acts regarding bank branch affairs, was ever adduced to establish the branch managers apparent authority to verbally alter the terms of mortgage contracts. Neither was there any allegation, much less proof, that PCRB ratified Mondigos act or is estopped to make a contrary claim. 

Further, we would be unduly stretching the doctrine of apparent authority were we to consider the power to undo or nullify solemn agreements validly entered into as within the doctrines ambit. Although a branch manager, within his field and as to third persons, is the general agent and is in general charge of the corporation, with apparent authority commensurate with the ordinary business entrusted him and the usual course and conduct thereof, yet the power to modify or nullify corporate contracts remains generally in the board of directors. Being a mere branch manager alone is insufficient to support the conclusion that Mondigo has been clothed with apparent authority to verbally alter terms of written contracts, especially when viewed against the telling circumstances of this case: the unequivocal provision in the mortgage contract; PCRBs vigorous denial that any agreement to release the mortgage was ever entered into by it; and, the fact that the purported agreement was not even reduced into writing considering its legal effects on the parties interests. To put it simply, the burden of proving the authority of Mondigo to alter or novate the mortgage contract has not been established.

ROBERTO V. SAN JOSE and DELFIN P. ANGCAO vs. JOSE MA. OZAMIZ

G.R. No. 190590 July 12, 2017

Intra-corporate dispute

Facts: Angcao was elected to serve as the Corporate Secretary of PHC. Ozamiz was a stockholder of PHC since 6 January 1997. On 11 May 2007, he wrote petitioners to request for a copy of all the Minutes of the Meetings of the Board of Directors and Executive Committee of PHC from 2000 to 2007 and a certification as to the completeness thereof. On 18 May 2007, Ozamiz's secretary inquired from the office of Angcao if the minutes were ready and was informed that the request was referred to the Board of Directors for approval. In a letter to Angcao, Ozamiz demanded for either the copies of the minutes and the issuance of the requested certification of completeness or an explanation in writing for his refusal to do so. Ozamiz and his secretary followed-up with the petitioners to no avail. 

At the meeting of the Board of Directors, the request of Ozamiz was discussed. Considering that a similar case filed by Atty. Victor Africa for the inspection of the books of PHC was still pending in court, and in view of the fact that Ozamiz belonged to the same group as Atty. Africa, the matter was referred by the Board of Directors to the PHC Legal Committee for study and recommendation. Until his resignation in 22 January 2008, Angcao never heard from Ozamiz again. Ozamiz filed a complaint for inspection of books with the RTC. Petitioners argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

Issue: Whether this case involves an intra-corporate dispute.

Held: To determine whether or not a case involves an intra-corporate dispute, two tests are applied - the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test.

Under the relationship test, there is an intra-corporate controversy when the conflict is (1) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as its franchise, permit, or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership, or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners, or associates themselves.

On the other hand, in accordance with the nature of controversy test, an intra-corporate controversy arises when the cor:1troversy is not only rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but also in the enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.

Based on the foregoing tests, it is clear that this case involves an intra-corporate dispute. It is a conflict between a stockholder and the corporation, which satisfies the relationship test, and it involves the enforcement of the right of Ozamiz, as a stockholder, to inspect the books of PHC and the obligation of the latter to allow its stockholder to inspect its books.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

LINTON COMMERCIAL CO., INC. and DESIREE ONG vs. ALEX A. HELLERA, FRANCISCO RACASA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 163147 October 10, 2007

Permissible Reduction of Working Hours

Facts: Linton issued a memorandum informing its employees decision to suspend its operations from 18 December 1997 to 5 January 1998 due to the currency crisis that affected its business operations. On 7 January 1997, Linton issued another memorandum informing them that effective 12 January 1998, it would implement a new compressed workweek of three (3) days on a rotation basis. On the same day, Linton submitted an establishment termination report concerning the rotation of its workers. Linton proceeded with the implementation of the new policy without waiting for its approval by DOLE. Aggrieved, sixty-eight (68) workers (workers) filed a Complaint for illegal reduction of workdays. The workers pointed out that Linton implemented the reduction of work hours without observing Article 283 of the Labor Code, which required submission of notice thereof to DOLE one month prior to the implementation of reduction of personnel, since Linton filed only the establishment termination report enacting the compressed workweek on the very date of its implementation.

Issue: Whether there was an illegal reduction of work when Linton implemented a compressed workweek by reducing from six to three the number of working days with the employees working on a rotation basis.

Held: Yes. The compressed workweek arrangement was unjustified and illegal. A close examination of petitioners’ financial reports for 1997-1998 shows that it retained a considerable amount of earnings and operating income. A year of financial losses would not warrant the immolation of the welfare of the employees, which in this case was done through a reduced workweek that resulted in an unsettling diminution of the periodic pay for a protracted period. Permitting reduction of work and pay at the slightest indication of losses would be contrary to the States policy to afford protection to labor and provide full employment. Management has the prerogative to come up with measures to ensure profitability or loss minimization. However, such privilege is not absolute. Management prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor. 

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that the 21 workers who executed waivers and quitclaims are no longer entitled to back payments. Petitioners are ORDERED TO PAY respondents, except the aforementioned 21 workers, the monetary award as computed, pursuant to the decision of the Labor Arbiter with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 12 December 2003, the date of promulgation of the Court of Appeals’ decision, until the finality of this decision, and thereafter at the rate of 12% per annum until full payment.

ROYAL PLANT WORKERS UNION vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.-CEBU PLANT

G.R. No. 198783 April 15, 2013

Management Prerogative

Facts: Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of softdrink products. The bottling operators work in two shifts. The first shift is from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and the second shift is from 5 p.m. up to the time production operations is finished. In 1974, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 2 were provided with chairs upon their request. In 1988, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 1 followed suit and asked to be provided also with chairs. Their request was likewise granted. Sometime in September 2008, the chairs provided for the operators were removed pursuant to a national directive of petitioner. This directive is in line with the "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program of petitioner for bottling operators. The program reinforces the task of bottling operators to constantly move about in the performance of their duties and responsibilities. 

The bottling operators took issue with the removal of the chairs. Petitioner argued that the removal of the chairs is valid as it is a legitimate exercise of management prerogative, it does not violate the Labor Code and it does not violate the CBA it contracted with respondent. On the other hand, respondent espoused the contrary view. It contended that the bottling operators have been performing their assigned duties satisfactorily with the presence of the chairs; the removal of the chairs constitutes a violation of the Occupational Health and Safety Standards, the policy of the State to assure the right of workers to just and humane conditions of work as stated in Article 3 of the Labor Code and the Global Workplace Rights Policy.

Issue: Whether the removal of the chairs from the manufacturing/production lines by CCBPI is a valid exercise of management prerogatives

Held: Yes. In the present controversy, it cannot be denied that CCBPI removed the operators’ chairs pursuant to a national directive and in line with its "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program, launched to enable the Union to perform their duties and responsibilities more efficiently. The removal of the chairs was designed to increase work efficiency. Hence, CCBPI’s exercise of its management prerogative was made in good faith without doing any harm to the workers’ rights. 

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO, 6B’S TRUCKING CORPORATION, and SBT1 TRUCKING CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JAIME SAHOT

G.R. No. 142293 February 27, 2003

Industrial Partner vs. Employee

Facts: Sometime in 1958, private respondent Jaime Sahot started working as a truck helper for petitioners’ trucking business. In April 1994, Sahot inquired about his medical and retirement benefits with the Social Security System (SSS) but discovered that his premium payments had not been remitted by his employer. Sahot had filed a week-long leave sometime in May 1994. He was medically examined and treated for various illnesses. Management told him to file a formal request for extension of his leave. At the end of his week-long absence, Sahot applied for extension of his leave for the whole month of June, 1994. It was at this time when petitioners allegedly threatened to terminate his employment should he refuse to go back to work. Petitioners dismissed him from work, effective June 30, 1994. Sahot filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissa. Petitioners contend that private respondent was not illegally dismissed as a driver because he was in fact petitioners’ industrial partner. 

Issue: Whether respondent is petitioners’ industrial partner

Held: No. A computation of the age of complainant shows that he was only twenty-three (23) years when he started working with respondent as truck helper. How can we entertain in our mind that a twenty-three (23) year old man, working as a truck helper, be considered an industrial partner. Hence we rule that complainant was only an employee, not a partner of respondents from the time complainant started working for the petitioners. No written agreement exists to prove the partnership between the parties. Private respondent did not contribute money, property or industry for the purpose of engaging in the supposed business. There is no proof that he was receiving a share in the profits as a matter of course, during the period when the trucking business was under operation. Neither is there any proof that he had actively participated in the management, administration and adoption of policies of the business. Thus, the NLRC and the CA did not err in reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter that private respondent was an industrial partner from 1958 to 1994.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 29, 2000 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners must pay private respondent Jaime Sahot his separation pay for 36 years of service at the rate of one-half monthly pay for every year of service, amounting to P74,880.00, with interest of six per centum (6%) per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid.

ASIAN ALCOHOL CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

G.R. No. 131108. March 25, 1999

Management Prerogative

Facts: In September, 1991, the Parsons family, who originally owned the controlling stocks in Asian Alcohol, were driven by mounting business losses to sell their majority rights to Prior Holdings, Inc. The next month, Prior Holdings took over its management and operation. To thwart further losses of Asian Alcohol, Prior Holdings implemented a re-organizational plan and other cost-saving measures. 117 out of 360 employees were separated. The private respondents (water pump tenders, machine shop mechanic, briquetting plant operator, plant helper) are among those union members whose positions were abolished due to redundancy. Private respondents filed with the NLRC complaints for illegal dismissal alleging that Asian Alcohol used the retrenchment program as a subterfuge for the union busting. They claimed that they were singled out for separation by reason for their active participation in the union. They also asseverated that Asian Alcohol was not bankrupt as it has engaged in an aggressive scheme of contractual hiring.

Issue: Whether private respondents have been illegally dismissed

Held: No. The law allows an employer to downsize his business to meet clear and continuing economic threats. The right of management to dismiss workers during periods of business recession and to install labor saving devices to prevent losses is governed by Art. 283 of the Labor Code, as amended. 

Prior Holdings took over the operations of Asian Alcohol in October 1991. They were incurred under the management of the Parsons family and continued to be suffered under the new management of Prior Holdings. Ultimately, it is Prior Holding that will absorb all the losses, including those incurred under the former owners of the company. The law gives the new management every right to undertake measures to save the company from bankruptcy. We find that the re-organizational plan and comprehensive cost-saving program to turn the business around were nor designed to bust the union of the private respondent.

Private respondent failed to proffer any proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner in engaging the services of an independent contractor to operate the Laura wells. Absent such proof, the Court has no basis to interfere with the bona fide decision of management to effect more economic and efficient methods of production.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated May 30, 1997 and its Resolution dated September 25, 1997 are ANNULED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter dated January 10, 1996 in RAB Case No. 06-12-10893-92 is ORDERED REINSTATED. The complaints for illegal dismissal filed by private respondents against Asian Alcohol Corporation are hereby ORDERED DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. No cost.

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, vs. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

Facts: Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC). Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook profile.

Back at the school a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. What is more, the students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.

Following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook. Petitioners filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data on the basis of the following considerations:

• The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party; 
• The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected. 
• Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright; 
• The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. 
• The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and 
• All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum. 

The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. 

Issue: Whether there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Held: No. As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to STC. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to teacher.

However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO

G.R. No. 225642-43 January 17, 2018

Maria Clara Doctrine 

Facts: [AAA] was watching a beauty contest with her aunt held at a basketball court where a make-shift stage was put up. She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong Cooperative near the basketball court. Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. He placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull movement. She shouted for help and then three (3) men came to her rescue [so] Amarela fled.

The three (3) persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with her. So she fled and hid in a neighboring house. When she saw that the persons were no longer around, she proceeded on her way home. She went to the house of Godo Dumandan who brought her first to the Racho residence because Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home. Dumandan stayed behind so Neneng Racho asked her son [Racho] to bring her to her aunt's house instead. [AAA] then said that [Racho] brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of [AAA]. After consummating the act, [Racho] left her. So [AAA] went home alone.

For the defense, Amarela testified for himself denying that he had anything to do with what happened with AAA. On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping her.

The RTC found AAA's testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho, to be clear, positive, and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their denial as these could not have overcome the categorical testimony of AAA. 

Issue: Whether the testimony of the offended party sufficient to convict the accused

Held: We have hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. And while the factual setting back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.

The following circumstances, particularly, would cast doubt as to the credibility of AAA's testimony: (1) the version of AAA's story appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs materially from her testimony in court; (2) AAA could not have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the first time; (3) her testimony lacks material details on how she was brought under the stage against her will; and (4) the medical findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 of Davao City, in Criminal Case Nos. 64964-09 and 64965-09, as well as the 17 February 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC Nos. 01226 and 01227-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused-appellants Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho are ACQUITTED of the charge of rape on the ground of reasonable doubt. Their IMMEDIATE RELEASE from custody is hereby ordered unless they are being held for other lawful cause.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO

G.R. No. 221029 April 24, 2018

Effects of a Divorce Decree Initiated by a Filipino Citizen

Facts: Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of Entry of marriage by virtue of a judgment of divorce Japanese court. The Amended Petition, which captioned as if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:

• That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
• That a case for divorce was filed by Manalo in Japan and a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court 
• That this petition is filed for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national
• That petitioner prays, among others, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.

The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages."

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. 

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. 

Held: Yes. Based on a clear and plain reading of the paragraph 2 of Artilce 26, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. 

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. 

The foregoing notwithstanding, the fact of divorce must still first be proven. Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET AL. vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, ET AL

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

Publication Requirement for a Law to be Effective

Facts: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the laws?

Held: Yes. Respondents' argument is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.